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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to study the role of multi-product firms in
the market provision of product variety. The analysis is conducted us-
ing the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen
and Riordan (2007). Firstly, we show that multi-product firms are
at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis single-product firms and can
only emerge if economies of scope are sufficiently strong. Secondly,
under duopoly product variety may be higher or lower with respect to
both the first best and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium.
However, within a relevant range of parameter values duopolists dras-
tically restrict their product range in order to relax price competition,
and as a result product variety is far below the efficient level.
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1 Introduction
Does the market provide too much or too little product variety? Is the
supply of books, CD’s, TV programs, furniture or cereals sufficiently diverse
to efficiently match the preferences of heterogeneous consumers? Or, on the
contrary, do profit maximizing firms tend to produce a disproportionate array
of products and incur into excessive costs? The existing theoretical literature
clearly suggests that anything can happen, i.e., product diversity may be
excessive or insufficient depending on the relative strength of various effects.
However, the literature has typically focused on the case of single-product
firms (monopolistic competition). In contrast, in many markets individual
firms produce a significant fraction of all varieties. These multi-product
firms choose their product range as an additional strategic tool, which may
potentially affect the overall provision of variety. Does the presence of multi-
product firms reduce or expand product variety with respect to the case of
single-product firms? And with respect to the first best? Can an incumbent
firm use product proliferation to monopolize the market and prevent entry?
In this paper we address these issues by introducing multi-product firms
into the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen and
Riordan (2007). There are several reasons that justify the choice of model;
in particular, the spokes model provides a tractable, intuitive and transpar-
ent framework to study competition and product variety when neighboring
effects are absent, which is increasingly the case in many industries. By
considering a continuous approximation of the original model we show that
it is possible to study in the same framework alternative market structures,
including monopolistic competition (large number of single-product firms,
duopoly (two large multi-product firms) and even asymmetric competition
(one large multi-product firm) competing against a competitive fringe: a
large number of single-product firms).
The study of product diversity has been typically conducted using two
alternative families of models. On the one hand, spatial models of localized
competition, similar to those proposed by Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979),
have been extensively used. However, it is generally agreed that they are
not well suited to study either the welfare implications of product variety
or multi-product firms. On the other hand, a large literature has followed
Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) (SDS) and assumed the existence
of a representative consumer with well defined preferences over all possible
varieties. In this set up neighboring effects are absent and each firm competes
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against ‘the market’. Unfortunately, these models provide little guidance
regarding the set of circumstances under which one would expect, from a
social point of view, that equilibria would involve excessive or insufficient
product variety.1 In any case, these frameworks can easily accommodate
multi-product firms.2 The two papers which are most closely related to the
theme of this paper are Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) and Anderson and de
Palma (2006).
The spokes model (Chen and Riordan, 2007) extends the Hotelling model
to an arbitrary number of varieties in a perfectly symmetric set up. A crucial
feature of the model is that each consumer only cares about two varieties,
which differ across consumers. The preference space consists of N spokes
that start from the same central point. The producer of each potential vari-
ety is located in the extreme end of a different spoke. If N = 2 then we are
in the standard Hotelling set up. As N goes to infinity, and if each variety
is produced by a different firm, the model becomes an adequate represen-
tation of monopolistic competition. This set up provides new insights by
identifying the set of circumstances under which we should expect excessive
or insufficient product diversity.
In this paper we take the spokes model one step further by considering
multi-product firms. It turns out that the spokes model can accommodate
multi-product firms as easily as the SDSmodel and, moreover, it brings about
new insights and useful welfare results.
Tractability of the spokes model is considerably enhanced by assuming
that the number of varieties is sufficiently large. In the next section we
present the finite model and formulate the continuous approximation. Thus,
the product range of a multi-product firm can be treated as a continuous
variable. This approach could also be very useful in other applications of the
spokes framework.
In Section 3 we study the benchmark case (already examined in Chen
and Riordan, 2007) in which each potential variety is produced by a different
firm. The novelty here is that we use the continuous approximation, which
allows us to represent in the same graph the fraction of active varieties as a
function of the fixed cost, under both scenarios: the free entry equilibrium
1A notable exception is Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), which we discuss in more detail
below.
2Some of the prominent and recent papers include Allanson and Montagna (2005),
Nocke and Yeaple (2006), Eckel and Neary (2006), Bernard et al. (2006). These papers
are mostly concerned with the role of multiproduct firms in a trade liberalization process.
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and the first best. As a result we can visualize the regions of parameter values
for which market forces deliver excessive or insufficient product variety.
The main goal of Section 4 is to understand the role of preferences, first-
mover advantages, and economies of scope in the emergence of multi-product
firms. We consider a game played between a single (large) multi-product firm
and a large number of single-product (small) monopolistically competitive
firms. We ask whether or not the large firm enjoys a competitive advantage
vis-a-vis small firms in the absence of economies of scope. If we focus on the
most interesting region of the parameter space, in the pricing stage the large
firm behaves like a coalition formed by a fraction of single-product firms,
internalizes some of the cross price effects, and sets higher prices than small
firms. Thus, the presence of the large firm tends to relax price competition,
which creates a positive externality to small firms. In fact, profits per variety
are higher for single-product firms. The reason is that any small firm can
always imitate the pricing behavior of the large firm and make the same level
of profits per variety of the large firm, but in equilibrium small firms find it
profitable to set a lower price, which implies that they make higher profits per
variety. In free entry equilibrium small firms make zero profits, which implies
that no multi-product firm will be active. It is only in a particular region of
the parameter space where multi-product firms can survive simply because
in equilibrium all firms set the same price and make zero profits. These
results are independent of whether or not the large firm enjoys a first-mover
advantage. In other words, in contrast to the case of localized competition,
an incumbent firm cannot use product proliferation to monopolize the market
and prevent entry. To summarize, in industries characterized by non-localized
competition firm size (as measured by the length of its product range) is a
competitive disadvantage. Therefore, multi-product firms can only emerge if
economies of scope are sufficiently strong.
In Section 5, we assume that economies of scope are such that there can
only exist two (multi-product) firms in the market. Thus, firms choose both
product range and prices strategically. Product variety under duopoly can
be higher or lower than under monopolistic competition depending on the
relative strength of three different effects:
a) Cannibalization: a duopolist takes into account that introducing a
new variety reduces the demand for the other varieties it produces. The
cannibalization effect alone would tend to reduce product diversity.
b) Appropriability: For any total number of varieties, duopoly prices are
higher or equal than monopolistically competitive prices. Higher expected
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prices induce firms to expand their product range.
c) Strategic price effect : a duopolist anticipates that its product range
affects price competition. If consumers’ reservation prices are sufficiently
high then duopolists find it optimal to restrict product variety in order to
relax price competition. For low reservation prices the price competition
effect may be reversed and a duopolist may find it optimal to expand its
product variety in order to raise its rival’s prices.
As mentioned above product variety under monopolistic competition may
be insufficient or excessive with respect to the first best. Since duopolists
may expand or decrease product variety with respect to the level chosen by
monopolistically competitive firms, it is not surprising that product variety
under duopoly can also be excessive or insufficient depending on parameter
values. The size of the discrepancy between the market provision of variety
and the first best level is particularly large when consumers’ reservation prices
are not too small and the fixed cost per variety is relatively low. In the limit
case of zero fixed costs, duopolists may choose to produce a relatively low
fraction of potential varieties, as low as 50%, even though social efficiency
calls for 100%. Thus, in contrast to the case of single-product firms, under
duopoly product diversity may be inefficiently low for both low and high
values of the fixed cost, and inefficiently high for intermediate values.
Some of the effects that are present in this paper are similar, or at least
related, to those identified by the literature on multi-product firms in an SDS
framework (Ottaviano and Thisse, 1999, and Anderson and de Palma, 2006).
A non-desirable feature of the framework used in Ottaviano and Thisse
(1999) 3 is that the optimal prices of a multi-product firm are independent of
the number of varieties produced by the firm. In other words, in their set up
a firm cannot take advantage of producing a significant fraction of all poten-
tial varieties in order to raise its prices. In that model multi-product firms
generate less product diversity than in the case of monopolistic competition,
simply because of the cannibalization effect, which is roughly the same for all
parameter values. As a result, under multi-product firms product diversity
is socially excessive only if the fixed cost is sufficiently low (the threshold is
lower than under monopolistic competition). In contrast, in the current set
up when the fixed cost is low duopolists find it optimal (in the adequate pa-
rameter range) to restrict their product range in order to maintain a friendly
price environment, which results in insufficient product variety.
3See also Ottaviano et al (2002).
5
The strategic price effect of our duopoly game is related to that of An-
derson and de Palma (2006). In particular, in their model a broader product
range also induces more aggressive pricing behavior, although the reasons are
very different. In their set up consumers have preferences for both firms and
varieties. Consumers’ decisions are taken in two steps. First, they choose
which firm to purchase from. Second, they choose which products to buy
from the selected firm. As a result, a firm with a broader product range be-
comes more attractive to consumers, which induces a more aggressive price
response by rival firms. In free entry equilibrium there are too many firms,
each one producing too narrow a product range. In contrast (and consistent
with Ottaviano and Thisse, 1999), we consider markets where consumers
have preferences only for varieties and hence it is possible to discuss whether
overall product variety under multi-product firms is excessive or insufficient
from a social point of view.
The results of this paper also contrast with those obtained in standard
spatial models (See, for instance, Schmalensee, 1978; and Bonanno, 1987).
In these models, an incumbent firm may find it profitable to monopolize
the market by crowding the product space or by choosing the appropriate
location. Instead, the current set up suggests that the presence of neighboring
effects in those models was crucial for their results. In fact, in the absence
of neighboring effects proliferation cannot be an effective entry deterrence
mechanism.
2 The spokes model
2.1 Finite number of varieties (Chen and Riordan, 2007)
Let us consider a market where there are N potential varieties, indexed by i,
i = 1, ..., N . A particular variety may or may not be supplied. The preference
space can be described in a way similar to the standard spatial models. There
are N spokes of length 1
2
, also indexed by i, i = 1, ..., N, which start from
the same central point. The producer of variety i is located in the extreme
end of spoke i.
Demand is perfectly symmetric. There is a continuum of consumers with
mass N
2
uniformly distributed over the N spokes. Each consumer has a taste
for two varieties only and the pair of selected varieties differ across consumers.
In fact, consumers are uniformly distributed over the N(N−1)
2
possible pairs.
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Thus, the mass of consumers who have a taste for an arbitrary pair is 1N−1
and since there are N − 1 pairs that contain a particular variety, the mass of
consumers who have a taste for variety i is 1.
Consumers with a taste for varieties i and j, i, j = 1, ..., N, j 6= i, are uni-
formly distributed over the union of spokes i and j. Each consumer demands
one unit of the good. As usual consumer location represents the relative
valuation of the two varieties. In particular, a consumer who has a taste for
varieties i and j and is located at a distance x, x ∈
£
0, 1
2
¤
, from the extreme
of the ith spoke, if she chooses to consume one unit of variety i then she
obtains a utility equal to R − tx. Alternatively if she chooses to consume
one unit of variety j then she obtains R− t (1− x) . A maintained hypothesis
is R > 2t. Under this condition, for any given number of active varieties,
single-product firms always have incentives to serve as many consumers as
possible, which simplifies the presentation.4
Suppose all N varieties are active, each one supplied by an independent
firm. If N = 2 then this is the standard Hotelling model. If N > 2 firm
i competes symmetrically with the other N − 1 firms. If N is very large
the model captures Chamberlain (1933)’s definition of monopolistic compe-
tition, in the sense that each firm: (i) enjoys some market power, i.e., faces a
downward sloping demand function, and (ii) is negligible, if ejected from the
market then no other firm is significantly affected.
Supplying a variety involves a fixed cost, F , and, for simplicity, zero
marginal costs.
2.2 The continuous approximation
It will be very convenient to treat the number of active varieties as a con-
tinuous variable. In particular, let us denote by γ, γ ∈ [0, 1] , the fraction of
active varieties. If 0 < γ < 1, consumers can be classified in three different
groups. Some consumers will have access to the two varieties they have a
taste for, some other consumers will only be able to buy one of the varieties,
and finally the third group of consumers will drop out of the market since
neither of the two selected varieties is available.
We can treat γ as a continuous variable by considering the limit model as
N goes to infinity and expressing all relevant variables relative to the total
mass of consumers. In particular, for a given value of γ and N, the number
4Chen and Riordan (2007) consider a larger parameter space, R > t.
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of pairs of varieties for which two suppliers are active is:
γN (γN − 1)
2
Since the fraction of consumers who have a taste for a particular pair is:
2
N (N − 1)
then the fraction of consumers who have access to two varieties is:
γN (γN − 1)
N (N − 1)
If we take the limit as N goes to infinity the fraction of consumers with
access to two varieties is γ2.
Similarly, the fraction of consumers that have access to neither of the two
preferred varieties is (1− γ)2 . Finally, the fraction of consumers with access
to only one variety is 2γ (1− γ) .
The total amount of fixed costs per consumer is:
γNF
N
2
= 2γF
From the point of view of supplier i, the fraction of consumers that de-
mand variety i and have the opportunity of choosing between product i and
their other selected variety is:
γN − 1
N − 1
Hence, as N goes to infinity this fraction is equal to γ. Similarly, in the
limit as N goes to infinity, the fraction of consumers that demand variety i
and do not have access to the other selected variety is 1− γ.
2.3 The first best
What is the fraction of active varieties that maximizes total surplus? For
any fraction, γ, it is efficient to allocate those consumers who have access to
their two selected varieties to the closest supplier. Thus, the average surplus
obtained by consumers with access to two varieties is R− t
4
, since the average
transportation cost is t
4
. Those consumers that only have access to one variety
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will incur on average higher transportation costs. Specifically, their surplus
will be R− t
2
. Finally, those consumers without access to any of their selected
varieties will receive zero surplus. As mentioned above the amount of fixed
costs per consumer is 2γF. Therefore, we can write total surplus as follows:
W (γ) = γ2
µ
R− t
4
¶
+ 2γ (1− γ)
µ
R− t
2
¶
− 2γF
Since this function is concave the optimal value of γ, denoted by γ∗ , can
be computed directly from the first order condition:
dW
dγ
= 2γ
µ
R− t
4
¶
+ 2 (1− 2γ)
µ
R− t
2
¶
− 2F = 0
which implies that (See Figure 1)
γ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if F ≥ R− t
2
R− t
2
−F
R− 3
4
t if
t
4
≤ F ≤ R− t
2
1 if F ≤ t
4
In order to obtain some intuition we can rewrite the first order condition
as follows:
dW
dγ
= 2
½
γ
t
4
+ (1− γ)
µ
R− t
2
¶
− F
¾
= 0
The first term represents the preference matching effect. A fraction γ of
consumers who have a taste for the new variety already had access to one of
their selected varieties and they will enjoy lower average transportation costs¡
t
4
¢
, i.e., there is a better matching between available products and consumer
preferences. The second term is the market expansion or aggregate demand
effect. A fraction 1 − γ of consumers did not have access to any of their
selected varieties and once the new variety is introduced they will purchase
one unit of the good and enjoy an average surplus of
¡
R− t
2
¢
.The relative
weights of these two effects depend on the fraction of existing varieties. Since
R− t
2
> t
4
then total surplus created by an additional variety decreases with
γ. Finally, the third term is the cost of entry.
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3 The benchmark: Monopolistic competition
In this section we consider the case in which the number of potential firms
is equal to the number of potential varieties, N. Each firm can produce only
one variety. If firm i decides to enter the market then it pays a fixed cost,
F, and chooses a price, pi. Firms maximize profits and enter the market
only if net profits are positive. Since each firm is negligible and there is
no uncertainty, then it does not matter whether entry and price decisions
are taken sequentially or simultaneously. We focus exclusively on symmetric
equilibria of this free entry game.
Let us first calculate the symmetric equilibrium price, for a given γ. In
those market segments where consumers have access to two varieties, con-
sumers will choose supplier exactly as in the Hotelling model. That is, the
fraction of consumers that choose firm i is given by:
1
2
+
p− pi
2t
where p is the price charged by rival firms.5 In those segments where firm
i0s product is the consumers’ only choice total demand is 1, provided all
consumers obtain a positive surplus, i.e., p1 + t ≤ R. In fact, under the
maintained hypothesis (R > 2t) firms never find it optimal to set a price
above R− t (See Appendix). In other words, firms have incentives to serve
as many consumers as possible. Hence, firm i’s optimization problem consists
of choosing pi in order to maximize:
πi (γ, pi, p) =
∙
γ
µ
1
2
+
p− pi
2t
¶
+ 1− γ
¸
pi − F (1)
subject to pi ≤ R − t. If this constraint is not binding then the optimal
price is given by:
pi =
t (2− γ)
2γ
+
p
2
Hence, the symmetric equilibrium price, pi = p ≡ pMC , is:
pMC = t
2− γ
γ
(2)
5And provided pi ∈ [p− t, p+ t] . See below.
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As γ increases competition intensifies and the price falls. If all potential
varieties are active (γ = 1) then p = t, as in the standard Hotelling model.
Equilibrium price is given by equation (2) provided its value is not above
R − t, which is equivalent to γ ≥ 2tR . Moreover, if pMC + t < R − t, an
individual firm may find it optimal to deviate from pMC and set pi = R− t.
Such a deviation is not profitable provided:
R
t
≤ Ψ (γ) ≡ 1 + (2− γ)
2
2γ (1− γ) (3)
If condition (3) does not hold then a symmetric equilibrium does not
exist.6
Hence, provided γ ∈
£
2t
R , 1
¤
the fraction of active varieties in equilibrium,
γMC , will be given by the zero profit condition:
πi
¡
γMC , pMC , pMC
¢
=
t
2
¡
2− γMC
¢2
γMC
− F = 0
Equivalently, if F ∈
h
t
2
, (R−t)
2
R
i
then (provided condition (3) holds):
γMC (F ) = 2 +
F
t
−
sµ
2 +
F
t
¶2
− 4 (4)
and if F ≤ t
2
then γMC = 1.
If instead γ < 2tR , which occurs whenever F ≥
(R−t)2
R , then each individual
firm faces little competition and finds it optimal to set a price equal to R− t,
and serve all consumers that have no other choice. In this case, the zero
profit condition is:
πi
¡
γMC , R− t, R− t
¢
=
2− γMC
2
(R− t)− F = 0
Hence, if F ∈
h
(R−t)2
R , R− t
i
then
γMC (F ) = 2
R− t− F
R− t (5)
and if F ≥ R− t then γMC = 0.
6Note that Ψ (γ) reaches a minimum at γ = 23 , and that Ψ
¡
2
3
¢
= 5.
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We can compare product diversity under monopolistic competition with
the first best. This comparison is simple for extreme values of F. In particular,
if F is sufficiently low, such that γMC is close to 1, then there is excessive
entry, i.e., γMC > γ∗. In contrast, if F is sufficiently high, such that γMC
is close to zero, then there is insufficient entry, i.e., γMC < γ∗. However,
the results for intermediate values of F are somewhat more complicated.
We can distinguish between two cases. If R <
¡
5
2
+
√
2
¢
t (case A), then
γMC (F ) and γ∗ (F ) only cross each other once, at a threshold value Fa, Fa ∈h
(R−t)2
R , R− t
i
. Thus, there is excessive entry for relatively low values of F
(F < Fa) and insufficient entry for relatively high values of F (F > Fa).
Figure 1a illustrates this case. However, if If R >
¡
5
2
+
√
2
¢
t (case B), then
γMC (F ) and γ∗ (F ) cross each other three times, at values Fb, Fc and Fa, such
that t
2
< Fb < Fc <
(R−t)2
R < Fa < R− t, and hence we obtain two intervals
with excessive entry and two intervals of excessive entry which alternate.
This case is illustrated in Figure 1b (See Appendix for the algebraic details.)
This discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under monopolistic competition: (i) if R <
¡
5
2
+
√
2
¢
t,
then there is excessive entry if F ∈
¡
t
4
, Fa
¢
and insufficient entry if F ∈¡
Fa, R− t2
¢
. (ii) if R >
¡
5
2
+
√
2
¢
t, then there is excessive entry if F ∈¡
t
4
, Fb
¢
∪ (Fc, Fa) and insufficient entry if F ∈ (Fb, Fc) ∪
¡
Fa, R− t2
¢
The number of varieties in a monopolistically competitive equilibrium
can be excessive or insufficient from the social viewpoint depending on the
relative weight of three different effects:
a)No price discrimination: firms cannot price discriminate among hetero-
geneous consumers. This is one of the reasons why firms cannot appropriate
all the surplus they create by entering the market.
b) Price competition: Monopolistically competitive prices may be lower
than under monopoly, provided the number of varieties is not too small.
c) Business stealing: A fraction of the customers of an entrant firm are
stolen from existing firms. Profits made out of stolen customers are always
higher than the reduction in transportation costs experienced by these real-
located consumers.
Thus, the first and second effects depress private incentives with respect
to social incentives and hence work in favor of insufficient product variety.
In contrast, the third effect exacerbates private incentives and works in favor
of excessive product variety.
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In Salop’s model, if the entry cost is higher than a certain threshold then
all firms are local monopolists. As a result, the second and third effect are
non-operative and in equilibrium product variety is insufficient. However, if
the entry cost is below the threshold (which is the usual maintained hypothe-
sis) then the entire market is served. In this case, the business stealing effect
dominates and in equilibrium product variety is excessive.
For extreme values of F the spokes model behaves like Salop’s. If F
is sufficiently low to support equilibrium values of γ close to one, then the
business stealing effect dominates (excessive product variety). Similarly, if
F is sufficiently high to support equilibrium values of γ close to zero, then
firms are close to being local monopolists and the no price discrimination
effect dominates (insufficient product variety).
For intermediate values of F it is not so easy to track the relative strength
of these three different effects. In the spokes model, the strength of both the
price competition and the business stealing effects increase with the number
of varieties. Since these two effects work in opposite directions it is not ob-
vious what is the net effect of a change in γ on the difference between the
private and social incentives to enter. As F decreases from levels that sup-
port equilibrium values of γ close to zero, then γ increases and the business
stealing effect intensifies (equilibrium prices are constant provided γ < 2tR ).
At a certain point the business stealing dominates the no price discrimination
effect and private incentives to enter are larger than social incentives (exces-
sive product variety). If F falls so much that γ increases above 2tR , then the
price competition effect starts biting and private incentives to enter are mod-
erated. If R is sufficiently low then the price competition effect is relatively
weak (in other words, monopoly price is relatively low) and the price com-
petition effect cannot overturn the business stealing effect, and as a result
product variety is excessive for all values of γ above 2tR . In this case the para-
meter space is divided into two intervals, with excessive product variety for
relatively low values of F and insufficient product variety for relatively high
values of F. However, if R is sufficiently large then the competition effect,
together with the no price discrimination effect may dominate the business
stealing effect for intermediate values of γ. In this case, the parameter space
is divided into four intervals. We still obtain excessive product variety for
extreme low values of F , insufficient product variety for extreme high values
of F, but the sign of the inefficiency alternates for intermediate values of F .
Obviously, these results are equivalent to those obtained in Chen and
Riordan (2007). Working directly in the limiting case of a large number of
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firms, plus focusing on a slightly smaller parameter space (R > 2t), simplifies
the presentation (the reader should compare our Figure 1 with their Figure 3
and Tables 1 and 2) and, more importantly, sets the stage for the introduction
of multi-product firms.
4 Asymmetric competition
The main goal of this section is to determine whether or not, in the current
set up, size (as measured by the number of varieties) is a source of competitive
advantage and whether product proliferation is an effective entry deterrence
mechanism. In order to address these issues we consider an incumbent mo-
nopolist who anticipates potential competition from a large number of small
firms, each one of them able to supply a single variety (a competitive fringe).
In order to focus on the potential strategic effect of committing to a large
product range, we assume there are no economies of scope. Can the in-
cumbent firm crowd the product space and make further entry unprofitable?
What is the outcome of such preemption efforts in terms of product selection
and prices? These questions have been examined in the context of standard
spatial models (See Schmalensee, 1978; and Bonanno, 1987).
Consider the following three stage game. In the first stage firm L chooses
the fraction of varieties, γL, and pays the fixed costs associated to activating
new varieties, FγL. In the second stage, small firms decide whether or not
to enter, and hence the mass of small active firms, γC , is determined. Fixed
costs are the same for small and large firms, so that each small firm that
chooses to enter pays F. In the third stage, firms simultaneously set the
prices for those varieties that have been activated. For simplicity all firms
face zero marginal costs.
We will disregard the trivial case where F is sufficiently low such that a
large firm may find it optimal to set γL = 1 and hence make further entry
physically impossible.7
The analysis of this game provides very transparent and powerful intu-
itions that suggest that the main qualitative results of the model are likely to
hold in a large family of models of non-localized competition. However, work-
ing out all the details takes time and effort. For these reasons we have moved
7Thus, we focus on the case that if γL = 1 then πL < 0. That is, F >
1
2
¡
R− t2
¢
.
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the formal analysis to the Appendix. Before discussing the main intuitions
we first state the main result of this section.
Proposition 2 If F ∈
h
(R−t)2
R , R− t
i
then γC + γL = γMC and the val-
ues of γC and γL are undetermined (all firms make zero profits). If F ∈³
2R−t
4
, (R−t)
2
R
´
then γL = 0 and γC = γMC . In other words, the large firm
cannot exploit its size and first mover advantages and make strictly positive
profits.
When neighboring effects are absent, a large multi-product firm behaves
as a coalition of a subset of single-product firms in the pricing stage. Thus, it
internalizes some of the cross-price effects and tends to set a higher price than
single-product firms. More specifically, given that firms face kinked demand
curves there are parameter values (relatively high fixed cost) for which the
multi-product firm sets the same prices as single-product firms, but for other
parameter values (relatively low fixed cost) its prices are strictly higher. In
the first case, profits per variety are the same for all firms independent of
their size. Since there is free entry in equilibrium all firms make zero profits.
In the latter case, the presence of a large multi-product firm creates a posi-
tive externality to single-product firms by relaxing price competition, which
creates further incentives to enter. In fact, such "collusive behavior" bene-
fits single-product firms more than the multi-product firm. In other words,
profits per variety of the large firm are lower than those of small firms. The
reason is the following. A single-product firm can always imitate the pricing
behavior of the large firm and make the same profits per variety. If these
firms choose not to do so and set a lower price it is because their profits are
strictly higher. In free entry equilibrium small firms make zero profits, which
implies that (in this region of parameters) the large firm finds it optimal to
set γL = 0.
To summarize, in the absence of neighboring effects and economies of
scope, the size of a firm’s product range cannot be a source of competi-
tive advantage. Moreover, it can be a source of competitive disadvantage.
Therefore, multi-product firms will emerge only in the presence of sufficiently
strong economies of scope, which compensate for the disadvantage associated
with the pricing behavior anticipated by small firms.8
8If we let the large firm precommit to both product range and prices then a large firm
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In standard location models (see, in particular, Schamalensee, 1978, and
Bonanno, 1987) it was shown that an incumbent monopolist may find it
optimal to prevent further entry by either crowding out the product space
or by choosing the right location pattern. Our results indicate that this is
only possible when competition is localized and the firm producing the new
brand competes only with one or two of the existing brands. In this case,
the entrant correctly anticipates that the incumbent firm will react to the
entry decision by cutting the price of the competing brands. In contrast, in
our set up those neighboring effects are absent and a new brand does not
change the prices of existing brands, which implies that, for a given number
of established brands, incentives to enter increase with concentration.
5 Symmetric duopoly
The presence of economies of scope creates incentives to form large multi-
product firms, each one producing a significant fraction of the total number of
varieties. The aim of this section is to investigate how the strategic incentives
of large multi-product firms affect prices and, specially, product diversity. In
order to simplify the presentation, instead of allowing for an endogenous
number of firms, we restrict attention to the duopoly case.9
Let us consider the following game. There are two firms, A and B. In
the first stage firms simultaneously choose the fraction of potential varieties
they wish to supply, γA and γB. In the second stage, after observing γA
and γB, firms simultaneously set prices for all the active varieties. We focus
on symmetric subgame perfect equilibria, where γA = γB =
1
2
γD, and all
varieties are sold at the same price.
In the second stage, given γA and γB, a fraction γ2A of consumers will have
access to two varieties supplied by firm A, a fraction 2γA (1− γA − γB) will
have access only to one of the varieties supplied by firm A, and a fraction
2γAγB will have access to one variety supplied by firm A and one variety
can survive, but only by setting the prices prevailing in a monopolistically competitive
equilibrium, which implies zero profits.
9We could have followed Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) or Anderson and de Palma (2006)
and assumed that there is an arbitrary number of potential firms, each one of them must
pay an entry cost, G, and a fixed cost Fγ, which is proportional to the fraction of varieties
produced by the firm, γ. Clearly, there would be values of G for which the equilibrium
configuration is a duopoly.
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supplied by firm B. Hence, firm A enjoys absolute monopoly power with the
first two groups of consumers and competes with firm B for the third group.
In the first part of this section we focus on the case R ≥ 3t. At the end
of the section we discuss the case 2t < R < 3t, where some of the effects are
reversed and therefore requires separate consideration.
5.1 The case of high reservation prices
In this subsection we restrict ourselves to the case R > 3t. In this case no
firm has incentives to set a price above R − t (See Appendix). Hence, we
can write firms’ optimization problem in the second stage as follows. Firm
A chooses the price of its varieties, pA, in order to maximize:
πA =
∙
γ2A + 2γA (1− γA − γB) + 2γAγB
µ
1
2
+
pB − pA
2t
¶¸
pA − 2γAF
subject to pA + t ≤ R.10 If the constraint is not binding then firm A0s
reaction function is:
pA =
t
2γB
(2− γA − γB) +
pB
2
As usual reaction functions are upward sloping (prices are strategic com-
plements). More interesting is the effect of the fraction of varieties supplied
by each firm on the optimal price. First, pA decreases with γA. The reason
is that the fraction of total consumers that have to choose between two va-
rieties supplied by different firms, 2γAγBγ2A+2γA(1−γA−γB)+2γAγB , increases with γA.
Second, pA decreases with γB. A higher γB reduces the fraction of consumers
that can only buy from firm A and raises the fraction of consumers that have
two options.
Firm B0s reaction function is symmetric. Thus, for a given pair (γA, γB),
in equilibrium firm A sets the following price:
pA =
t
3
(2− γA − γB) (2γA + γB)
γAγB
(6)
10It will be apparent that we need not worry about deviations such that pA /∈
[pB − t, pB + t] .
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Note that if γA = γB =
1
2
, then pA = pB = 2t. That is, if all potential
varieties are supplied (and firms hold a symmetric position), then prices
are higher under duopoly (2t) than under monopolistic competition (t) , but
lower than R− t. In fact, a duopolistic firm can be interpreted as a coalition
of one half of monopolistically competitive firms. By raising the price above
the monopolistically competitive level a duopolistic firm can raise its profits,
since two thirds of its potential consumers are able to choose between two
varieties supplied by different firms, but one third are trapped and can only
choose between two varieties supplied by the same firm. It is important to
note that pA decreases with both γA and γB. That is, the higher the fraction
of varieties supplied by either firm the lower the prices.
Along a symmetric equilibrium path, γA = γB =
1
2
γD. Thus, the candi-
date to equilibrium price can be obtained rewriting equation (6):
pD =
2t
¡
2− γD
¢
γD
provided pD ≤ R− t, i.e.:
γD ≥ 4t
R+ t
(7)
Let us begin the search for equilibrium candidates in the region of pa-
rameter values where condition (7) does not hold. In this case, firms are
expected to set prices equal to R− t and make profits:
πA = γA (2− γA − γB) (R− t)− 2γAF
This is firm A’s objective function in the first stage, which is concave in
γA. From the first order condition with respect to γA, evaluated at γA = γB =
1
2
γD, we obtain the level of product variety in the candidate equilibrium:
γD =
4
3
R− t− F
R− t (8)
provided γD ≤ 4tR+t , i.e. provided,
F ≥ (R− t) (R− 2t)
R+ t
Let us turn our attention to the case condition (7) holds. By plugging
equilibrium prices in the profit function we obtain firm A’s payoff as seen
from the first stage, i.e., profits as a function of γA and γB :
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πA (γA, γB) =
t
9γAγB
(2− γA − γB)2 (2γA + γB)2 − 2γAF
The first derivative evaluated at γA = γB =
1
2
γD is:
dπA
dγA
=
4t
¡
2− γD
¢ ¡
1− 2γD
¢
3γD
− 2F (9)
Note that if γD > 1
2
then the first derivative is negative. Thus, if 7t >
R > 3t, then 1
2
< 4tR+t < 1, and hence there is no symmetric equilibrium
where γD > 4tR+t . Moreover, γA = γB =
2t
R+t is in fact the unique symmetric
equilibrium (In the Appendix we show that no firm wants to deviate from
the proposed behavior). Summarizing, if 7t ≥ R > 3t and F ≥ (R−t)(R−2t)R+t ,
γD is given by equation (8), and if F ≤ (R−t)(R−2t)R+t , γD =
4t
R+t . Note that for
all F, firms never choose values of γA and γB that induce prices below R− t.
In case R > 7t, existence of symmetric equilibria is not guaranteed. In the
Appendix we show that there is no symmetric equilibrium with γD ≥ 4tR+t .11
Thus, the only equilibrium candidate is once again given by equation (8)
if F ≥ (R−t)(R−2t)R+t , and γD =
4t
R+t if F ≤
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t . Unfortunately, if F
is sufficiently low firms find it profitable to deviate and hence a symmetric
equilibrium does not exist.
All this discussion is summarized in the next Lemma:
Lemma 1 Whenever a symmetric equilibrium exists, γD is given by equation
(8) if F ≥ (R−t)(R−2t)R+t , and γD =
4t
R+t if F ≤
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t . A symmetric
equilibrium exists for all F if 7t ≥ R > 3t, but it does not exist if R ≥ 7t
and F sufficiently low.
If we compare γD with γMC then they cross each other twice at Fd and Fe,
such that t
2
< Fd <
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t < Fe <
(R−t)2
R . (See Figure 2 and Appendix
for details.)
Proposition 3 Under duopoly, if R > 3t, the fraction of varieties supplied
in a symmetric equilibrium is lower than under monopolistic competition, if
F ∈ [0, Fd) ∪ (Fe, R− t) , and higher if F ∈ (Fd, Fe).
11It turns out that even asymmetric (pure strategy) equilibria do not exist either.
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The differential incentives to introduce product variety by duopolistic and
monopolistically competitive firms depend on the relative weight of three
effects:
a) Cannibalization: if a multi-product firm introduces a new variety it
anticipates that some of the buyers are already customers of the firm.
b) Strategic price effect: a multi-product firm anticipates that introduc-
ing a higher number of varieties beyond a certain threshold triggers lower
equilibrium prices.
c) Appropriability: for any total number of varieties equilibrium prices
are higher or equal under duopoly than under monopolistic competition.
The first two effects work in favor of lower product diversity under duopoly.
The third effect works in the opposite direction as firms can appropriate a
larger fraction of the surplus created.
For relatively high values of F so that γMC is very low, both the strate-
gic price effect and the competition effect are non-operative since prices are
equal to the monopoly level under both market structures. In this case the
cannibalization effect dominates and product variety is lower under duopoly.
In contrast, if F is relatively low so that γMC is close to 1, the strategic
price effect dominates, since duopolistic firms are not willing to expand their
product range at the cost of triggering a price war. However, for intermediate
values of F, the competition effect dominates and duopolistic firms introduce
more product variety than monopolistic firms because they can charge higher
prices and appropriate a large fraction of total surplus.
Let us now compare γD and γ∗ (See Figure 3 and Appendix for details).
They cross each other twice at Ff and Fg, such that Ff <
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t < Fe <
Fg with Fd R Ff as R R 4t.
Proposition 4 Under duopoly, if R > 3t, the fraction of varieties supplied
in a symmetric equilibrium is insufficient if F ∈ [0, Ff) ∪
¡
Fg, R− t2
¢
, and
excessive if F ∈ (Ff , Fg) .
Duopolistic firms may also produce excessive product variety, but this is
only possible for intermediate values of F. Unlike monopolistic firms, if F is
low multi-product firms refrain from expanding their product range in order
to relax price competition, and as a result product variety is insufficient.
It is important to note that the strategic price effect may cause large inef-
ficiencies. Consider the case R = 7t and F = 0. In this case, social efficiency
requires all potential varieties being produced. In contrast, in equilibrium
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duopolists only produce one half of all potential varieties. Hence, the strate-
gic price effect may cause a substantial underprovision of product diversity.
5.2 The case of low reservation prices
Finally, we turn our attention to a region of the parameter space, 2t < R <
3t, where some of the effects analyzed above are reversed. In this region
firms may choose to set prices above R− t, and not to serve some potential
customers in submarkets where consumers can buy either one of the firms’
varieties or nothing. However, firms will never choose to set prices above
R − t
2
(See Appendix). In the second stage, firm A chooses pA in order to
maximize:
πA =
∙
γ2A + 2γA (1− γA − γB)
R− pA
t
+ 2γAγB
µ
1
2
+
pB − pA
2t
¶¸
pA−2γAF
subject to pA ∈
£
R− t, R− t
2
¤
. If these constraints are not binding then
firm A’s optimal price is given by:
pA =
(γA + γB) t+ 2 (1− γA − γB)R+ γBpB
2 (2− 2γA − γB)
If we let γ ≡ γA+ γB and taking into account firm B’s reaction function,
then we can write firm A’s equilibrium price as follows:
pA =
[γt+ (1− γ) 2R] [2 (2− γ)− γB]
8 (2− γ) (1− γ) + 3γAγB
Note that in this case pA increases with both γA and γB. In other words,
in this region of the parameter space the sign of the strategic price effect
is reversed. An expansion of a firm’s product range induces its rival to set
a higher price. That is, more product variety implies a more relaxed price
environment. The intuition is the following. If γB is very low, then firm
A pays a great of deal of attention to those submarkets where consumers
can either buy one of its varieties or nothing. Since R is relatively low with
respect to t then firm A has incentives to moderate its pricing (set a price
equal to R − t) and serve all these consumers. As γB increases then firm A
puts less weight on these submarkets and more weight on submarkets where
consumers can choose between varieties supplied by different firms. In those
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submarkets firm A does not have to attract consumers located at the other
end of the segment, but only consumers located in the middle. As a result
firm A finds it optimal to set a higher price.12
Thus, in the first stage, firms have incentives to expand their product
range in order to relax price competition in the second stage. As a result, the
strategic price effect, together with the competition effect, may dominate the
cannibalization effect. As a result, even in the case of low values of F product
variety under duopoly may be higher than under monopolistic competition
(and hence excessive from a social viewpoint).
In order to illustrate this point let us determine the set of values of F
that give rise to a symmetric equilibrium with γA = γB =
1
2
. In this case
pA = pB = 2t > R− t. Also, provided R > 52t, then pA = pB < R−
t
2
. It can
be shown (See Appendix) that this is an equilibrium provided F ≤ t. That
is, if F ∈
¡
t
2
, t
¤
then γD = 1 > γMC > γ∗.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the role of multi-product firms in the market
provision of product variety. The spokes model provides a very useful set
up to compare the product diversity generated by single-product as well as
multi-product firms in industries where neighboring effects can be neglected.
We have shown that multi-product firms are in a competitive disadvan-
tage vis-a-vis single-product firms and they will emerge only if economies of
scope are sufficiently strong. This result is independent of whether or not
a multi-product firm enjoys a first-mover advantage. In other words, in the
absence of neighboring effects product proliferation is not an effective entry
deterrence mechanism.
If economies of scope are such that only two firms can supply all possible
varieties, then it turns out that product variety may be higher or lower
than in the case of monopolistic competition; moreover, duopolists may also
provide too little or too much variety with respect to the first level. However,
for a relevant range of parameter values, duopolists drastically restrict their
product range in order to relax price competition. As a result, product
12The result that more product variety may imply higher prices is analogous to "price
rising entry" discussed by Chen and Riordan (2006) in the case of a finite number of
single-product firms. However, those related phenomena occur for different parameter
values because the presence of multiproduct firms tends to raise average prices.
22
diversity may be significantly lower than the efficient level.
These results contribute to a better understanding of the impact of multi-
product firms and nicely complement those obtained in the SDS framework.
Moreover, on a more methodological spirit, the analysis indicates that the
spokes set up is sufficiently flexible to accommodate multi-product firms and
hence it reinforces the idea that the model proposed by Chen and Riordan
(2007) is indeed a significant development within the family of spatial models.
The market structures considered in this paper are extreme and some-
what arbitrary. In some real world markets we do observe firms producing
a broad product range competing with firms producing a much more lim-
ited product range. Equilibria with asymmetric firms may be caused by first
mover advantages, but also by the existence of alternative technologies. Per-
haps, firms must incur a large sunk cost in order to reduce the fixed cost
associated with the production of each variety. In any case, to endogenize
the market structure seems a natural step forward. However, if we were to
follow this avenue we would be discussing not only the optimal number of
varieties but also the optimal number of firms.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us first consider the region where F ∈
h
(R−t)2
R , R− t
i
, i.e., γ < 2tR . We
need to check that in this region the only symmetric equilibrium involves
p = R− t. A representative firm i chooses pi in order to maximize:
πi =
∙
γ
µ
1
2
+
p− pi
2t
¶
+ (1− γ) R− pi
t
¸
pi
subject to pi ≥ R− t. The first order condition of an interior solution can
be written as:
pi =
γ (t+ p) + (1− γ) 2R
2 (2− γ)
If a symmetric equilibrium exists, then the price is given by:
p (γ) =
γt+ 2 (1− γ)R
4− 3γ
It turns out that p (0) = R
2
< R − t, and p0 (γ) < 0. We reach a contra-
diction. Moreover, if other firms set p = R − t according to the first order
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condition the best response is pi = R2 < R − t. Hence, the only symmetric
equilibrium involves p = R − t, and the equilibrium value of γ is given by
equation (5). Hence, in this region both γ∗ and γMC are linear functions of
F. Next, we compute the value of F, denoted Fa, at which γ∗ = γMC :
Fa =
(R− t)2
R− t
2
Note that (R−t)
2
R < Fa < R− t.
Let us now turn to the region where t
2
≤ F ≤ (R−t)
2
R . In this region γ
MC
is given by equation (4). As noted in the text γMC
¡
F = t
2
¢
> γ∗
¡
F = t
2
¢
and γMC
³
(R−t)2
R
´
> γ∗
³
(R−t)2
R
´
. In fact, dγ
MC
dF < 0 and
d2γMC
dF 2 > 0. Thus, in
principle γMC and γ∗ could cross twice in this region. If these two functions
cross in this interval, then they will do so for those values of γ that satisfy:
t
2
(2− γ)2
γ
= γ
µ
R− t
4
¶
+ (1− 2γ)
µ
R− t
2
¶
i.e.,
−
µ
2
R
t
− 1
2
¶
γ2 −
µ
2
R
t
+ 3
¶
γ + 4 = 0
The solutions of this quadratic equation are given by:
γ =
3 + 2Rt ±
q
4
¡
R
t
¢2 − 20Rt + 17
4Rt − 1
Real solutions are obtained if and only if 4
¡
R
t
¢2 − 20Rt + 17 ≥ 0, i.e.,
R
t ≥
5
2
+
√
2. If such a condition is satisfied then both real solutions belong to
the interval
£
2t
R , 1
¤
. In particular, the highest solution is lower than 1, that
is:
γ =
3 + 2Rt +
q
4
¡
R
t
¢2 − 20Rt + 17
4Rt − 1
< 1
which is equivalent to 4R > t. The lowest solution is higher than 2tR :
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3 + 2Rt −
q
4
¡
R
t
¢2 − 20Rt + 17
4Rt − 1
>
2t
R
which holds provided R > t. Let us denote by Fb and Fc the two values
of F at which γ∗ and γMC cross each other in the interval where 1 > γ > 2tR .
In fact, it is possible to compute explicit expressions for Fb and Fc (available
upon request.)
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
It is useful to start by examining the optimal pricing policy of a monopolist,
i.e., the optimal pL in case γC = 0. It is immediate that a monopolist never
sets a price below R− t or above R− t
2
. Thus, the optimal price maximizes:
πL = γL
∙
(1− γL)
R− pL
t
+
γL
2
¸
pL − γLF
subject to pL ∈
£
R− t, R− t
2
¤
. Thus, the monopoly price is:
pL =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R− t if γL ≤ 2(R−2t)2R−3t
γLt+(1−γL)2R
4(1−γL)
if 2(R−2t)
2R−3t ≤ γL ≤
2(R−t)
2R−t
R− t
2
if γL ≥ 2(R−t)2R−t
(10)
Note that pL weakly increases with γL. In submarkets where consumers
have access to two varieties the price elasticity is zero in the relevant interval.
As γL increases the fraction of submarkets where consumers have access to
two varieties is higher and hence the price elasticity of total demand is lower.
As a result the monopolist finds it optimal to charge a higher price.
Let us now turn our attention to the third stage of the game between the
multi-product firm and the competitive fringe. Given (γL, γC) and the price
set by the competitive fringe, pC, firm L chooses pL in order to maximize13:
πL =
½
γL
£
1− γL − γC + γL2 + γC
¡
1
2
+ pC−pL
2t
¢¤
pL − γLF if pL ≤ R− t
γL
£
(1− γL − γC) R−pLt +
γL
2
+ γC
¡
1
2
+ pC−pL
2t
¢¤
pL − γLF if R− t ≤ pL ≤ R− t2
13Since a monopolist never has incentives to set a price above R − t2 , it is immediate
to check that a large firm facing competition from a competitive fringe does not find it
optimal to set a price above R− t2 either.
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The reaction function is given by :
pL =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
t2−γ
2γC
+ pC
2
if pC ≤ pC
R− t if p
C
≤ pC ≤ bpC
γt+(1−γ)2R+γCpC
2(2−γ−γL)
if bpC ≤ pC ≤ pC
R− t
2
if pC ≥ pC
(11)
where γ ≡ γL + γC , pC ≡ 2RγC−t(2−γ+2γC)γC and bpC ≡ 2R(1−γL)−t(4−γ−2γL)γC
and pC ≡ 2R(1−γL)−t(2−γL)γC .
A small firm i chooses pi in order to maximize:14
πi =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
£
1− γL − γC + γC
¡
1
2
+ pC−pi
2t
¢
+ γL
¡
1
2
+ pL−pi
2t
¢¤
pi − F
if pi ≤ R− t£
(1− γL − γC)
¡R−pi
t
¢
+ γC
¡
1
2
+ pC−pi
2t
¢
+ γL
¡
1
2
+ pL−pi
2t
¢¤
pi − F
if pi > R− t
Assuming symmetry (pi = pC) the joint reaction function of small firms
can be written as:
pC =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(2−γL−γC)t+γLpL
2γL+γC
if pL ≤ pL
R− t, if p
L
≤ pL ≤ pL
(1−γ)R+γ
2
t+γL
2
pL
2−γ−γC
2
, if pL > pL
where p
L
≡ R(γ+γL)−t(2+γL)γL and pL =
R(2−γC)−t(4−3γ−γC)
γL
.
It is important to note that, given reaction functions (10) and (11), for
any (γL, γC) such that γL+ γC < 1 there exists a unique pure strategy equi-
librium in prices (pL, pC) . Depending on (γL, γC) , there are three possible
configurations of equilibrium prices:
(i) Region A: pC < pL ≤ R− t.
(ii) Region B : pC = pL = R− t.
(iii) Region C : R− t < pL, pC < pL.
14This expression has been written for the case that pL, pC ∈ [pi − t, pi + t] . As in the
case of monopolistic competition, and under some parameter values, a small firm may find
it optimal to deviate and set pi = R − t > pC + t. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium
where all small firms set the same price requires an additional restriction on parameter
values analogous to the one specified in Section 3.
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Unsurprisingly, small firms never set a price which is strictly higher than
that of a large firm.
In the third stage any small firm can imitate the behavior of the large
firm and set pi = pL. In this case, the profits of such a small firm are equal
to the profits per variety of the large firm. Since in equilibrium small firms
must make zero profits, then the large firm never chooses a value of γL > 0,
that induces an equilibrium price in a region with pC < pL. The reason is
that in this case: 1γLπ
L (pL) = πi (pL) < πi (pC) = 0 . Therefore, the large
firm only chooses γL > 0 if it anticipates that the subsequent equilibrium
price is in Region B, in which case both the large and the small firms make
zero profits.
Region B is determined by the following constraints: (i) R−t ≥ p
L
(small
firms do not want to set a price below R− t), (ii) p
C
≤ R− t (large firm does
not want to set a price below R − t), and (iii) R − t ≤ bpC (large firm does
want to set a price above R− t). Condition (i) is equivalent to:
γL + γC ≤
2t
R
(12)
Similarly, conditions (ii) and (iii) can be respectively written as:
γCR+ γLR ≤ 2t (13)
(2R− 3t) γL + (R− 2t) γC ≤ 2 (R− 2t) (14)
If R ≥ 3t then conditions (13) and (14) are redundant, and Region B is
defined as the set of (γL, γC) that satisfy condition (12). If 2t < R < 3t
then condition (13) is also redundant but condition (14) is not, and hence
(γL, γC) must satisfy both conditions (12) and (14) .
Let us consider the case that F takes values in the interval
h
(R−t)2
R , R− t
i
.
Under monopolistic competition, prices are equal to R − t, and product
variety, γMC , is given by the zero profit condition (5), where γMC ≤ 2tR . In
the current game, if all firms set prices equal toR−t then all active firms make
zero profits if and only if γC+γL = γMC . If firm L sets γL ∈
³
γMC , 2(R−2t)
2R−3t
´
,
then there are two possibilities: either no small firm enters and the large firm
sets pL = R − t, or γC > 0 and equilibrium prices correspond to Region C.
In both cases πL < 0. If γL >
2(R−2t)
2R−3t , then if γC = 0 the large firm sets a
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price above R− t and nevertheless πL < 0, since small firms can always set
pi = pL and make at least as much profits as πLγL .Alternatively, if γC > 0 then
equilibrium prices correspond to Region C and hence πL < 0. Consequently,
the large firm never sets γL > γMC .
If the large firm sets γL ≤ γMC then γC = γMC−γL (provided γL and γC
satisfy restriction (14)) and in equilibrium all firms make zero profits (Region
B). If γL ≤ γMC and γC = γMC −γL do not satisfy restriction (14) then the
resulting price equilibrium lies in Region C and hence πL < 0.
Let us now turn to the case F < (R−t)
2
R .Under monopolistic competition
firms charge a price below R − t and 1 > γMC > 2tR . In this case all the
combinations of γC and γL for which small firms make zero profits lie outside
Region B and therefore for any value of γL > 0 the price equilibrium lies in
Regions A or C and hence πL < 0.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider first 7t ≥ R > 3t. In the region where F ∈ [ (R−t)(R−2t)R+t , R − t],
we have γD < 4tR+t . Note that since we focus on the case that R > 3t then
4t
R+t < 1.We need to check that in this region the only symmetric equilibrium
involves p = R− t. Let us first consider prices above R− t. Firm A chooses
pA in order to maximize:
πA =
∙
γ2A + 2γA (1− γA − γB)
R− pA
t
+ 2γAγB
µ
1
2
+
pB − pA
2t
¶¸
pA
subject to R − t
2
≥ pi ≥ R − t. Suppose these constraints are not binding.
Then, firm A’s optimal price is given by:
pA =
(γA + γB) t+ 2 (1− γA − γB)R+ γBpB
2 (2− 2γA − γB)
If pB = R− t, then the optimal price, pA, will be given by:
pA =
R
2
+
γAt
2 (2− 2γA − γB)
< R− t
and the slope of the reaction function is less than one. Hence, there is no
symmetric equilibrium with prices above R− t.
Let us consider the case 3t < R ≤ 7t. As discussed in the text the
only candidate to a symmetric equilibrium includes pA = pB = R − t, and
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γA = γB = 1
2
γD where γD is given by equation (8) if F ≥ (R−t)(R−2t)R+t , and by
γD = 4tR+t ,otherwise. In the second stage there are no incentives to deviate,
and the arguments given in the main text are sufficient. However, in the first
stage there is a potential deviation that we need to check. In particular, say
firm A might find it optimal to set γA sufficiently above 2tR+t such that it
induces in the second stage prices below R − t. Profits after this deviation
are:
πdevA =
2(R+ t)
9γA
µ
2R
R+ t
− γA
¶2µ
γA +
t
R+ t
¶2
− 2γAF
whereas its profits under no deviation (i.e., for γA = γB =
1
2
γD = 2tR+t) are
πDA =
4t
R+ t
µ
(R− t)2
R+ t
− F
¶
Based on these expressions, we can write
πDA − πdevA =
2
R+ t
g(γA, R, t) +
µ
γA −
2t
R+ t
¶
2F
where
g(γA, R, t) ≡
2t(R− t)2
(R+ t)2
− (R+ t)
9γA
µ
2R
R+ t
− γA
¶2µ
γA +
t
R+ t
¶2
Since γA + γB ≤ 1, upward deviation with γA > 2tR+t yields an upper
bound for γA such that γA ≤ 1− γB = 1− 2tR+t =
R−t
R+t .
The function g(γA, R, t) is such that g(
1
2
γD, R, t) = 0. Additionally,
g(γA, R, t) is increasing in γA for all R ∈ (3t, 6.5t). Therefore, g(γA, R, t) > 0
for all γA >
2t
R+t provided R < 6.5t. When 6.5t < R < 7t we have that
g(γA, R, t) is decreasing in γA for relatively small deviations. Due to that,
we perform a numerical analysis to conclude that g(γA, R, t) > 0 for all
γA >
2t
R+t also when 6.5t < R < 7t (see Appendix on numerical simulations
for details). Thus, πDA > πdevA under 3t < R < 7t for all F , which means
that this upward global deviation cannot be profitable for 3t < R < 7t. This
shows that a symmetric equilibrium exists for all F if 3t < R < 7t.
If R ≥ 7t then there is another candidate for a symmetric equilibrium,
which is given by equalizing equation (9) to zero:
4t
¡
2− γD
¢ ¡
1− 2γD
¢
3γD
= 2F
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Unfortunately, second order conditions are not satisfied. More specifically,
under pA, pB ≤ R − t, first order conditions of firm A’s profit maximization
in the second stage yields
∂πA
∂pA
=
γA
t
(2t− tγA − tγB − 2pAγB + pBγB) = 0
and a similar expression for firm B. Solving these two equations:
pA =
1
3γAγB
(4tγA + 2tγB − 3tγAγB − 2tγ2A − tγ2B)
pB =
1
3γAγB
(4tγB + 2tγA − 3tγAγB − 2tγ2B − tγ2A)
Inserting these prices into each firm’s profit function and maximizing with
respect to the firm’s range of varieties yields
∂πA
∂γA
=
t
9γ2AγB
(16γ2A − 32γ3A − 4γ2B + 12γ4A + 4γ3B − γ4B − 32γ2AγB +
+24γ3AγB + 13γ
2
Aγ
2
B)− 2F
∂2πA
∂γ2A
=
2t
9γ3AγB
(4γ2B − 16γ3A + 12γ4A − 4γ3B + γ4B + 12γ3AγB)
Evaluating the second derivative at γA = γB =
1
2
γD we have ∂
2πA
∂γ2A
=
2t
9(γD)2 (16− 40γD + 25(γD)2) > 0 for all γD 6= 45 .
The other candidate is the same as in the case R < 7t. However, if F is
sufficiently low then firms have incentives to deviate and hence a symmetric
equilibrium does not exist. Below we discuss some numerical simulations
that provide a better idea of the extent of the existence problem (See also
the Appendix on numerical simulations.)
8.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We now compare γD with γMC. For F ≤ t
2
we have γD = 4tR+t and γ
MC = 1
so that γD < γMC; and for F ≥ (R−t)2R we have γD =
4
3
R−t−F
R−t and γ
MC =
2R−t−FR−t so that γ
D < γMC as well. For intermediate values of F such that
t
2
< F < (R−t)
2
R it turns out that γ
D and γMC cross twice. Specifically, for
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t
2
< F < (R−t)(R−2t)R+t we have γ
D = 4tR+t and
t
2
(2−γMC)2
γMC = F , and then γ
D and
γMC are equal at F = Fd, which is given by
Fd =
(R− t)2
2(R+ t)
where t
2
< Fd <
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t for all R > 3t.
For (R−t)(R−2t)R+t < F <
(R−t)2
R we have γ
D = 4
3
R−t−F
R−t and
t
2
(2−γMC)2
γMC = F .
Denote here the lower and the upper roots to γD(F ) = γMC(F ) by F− and
F+, respectively. Given that F− < 3R
2−8Rt+5t2
2(3R−t) <
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t , we can focus
on the upper root and thus write Fe = F+ as given by
Fe =
3(Rt )
2 − 8Rt + 5 + 3
q
η(Rt )
2
t (3
R
t − 1)
where η(Rt ) ≡ (
R
t )
4−6(Rt )3+12(
R
t )
2−10Rt +3. We now check that Fe is real
valued. Since η0(3) > 0 and η00(Rt ) > 0 for allR > 2t, we have η
0(Rt ) > 0 for all
R ≥ 3t. In consequence, η(Rt ) > 0 for all R > 3t due to the fact that η(3) = 0.
Thus, Fe is real valued for all R > 3t. Finally, we can write
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t < Fe
as 18
¡
3Rt − 1
¢ ¡
R
t − 3
¢ ¡
R
t − 1
¢3 > 0, which holds for all R > 3t; and we can
also write Fe <
(R−t)2
R as 2
¡
3Rt − 1
¢ ¡
R
t − 1
¢2
[3(Rt )
2−2] > 0, which holds for
all R > t.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Let us compare γD with γ∗ under R > 3t. For F ∈ [ t
4
, (R−t)(R−2t)R+t ] we have
γD = 4tR+t , which equals γ
∗(F ) at the value of F given by
Ff =
(R− t)(2R− 5t)
2(R+ t)
where t
4
< Ff <
(R−t)(R−2t)
R+t for all R > 3t, and Ff R Fd as R R 4t.
For F ∈ [ (R−t)(R−2t)R+t , R−
t
2
] we have γD = 4
3
R−t−F
R−t , which equals γ
∗(F ) at
the value of F given by
Fg =
(R− t)(2R− 3t)
2R
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where (R−t)(R−2t)R+t < Fg < R −
t
2
for all R > t. In addition, we can write
Fe < Fg as
¡
R
t − 1
¢3 ¡
3Rt − 1
¢
> 0, which holds for all R > 3t. This leads to
the intervals in the result.
8.6 Low reservation prices: R < 3t
With γA = γB =
1
2
we have pA = pB = 2t > R − t for all R < 3t, and
pA = pB < R− t2 for all R >
5
2
t. Then, at γA = γB =
1
2
it follows that
∂πA
∂γA
¯¯¯¯
γA=γB=
1
2
=
2
3
(22t− 6R)− 2F
which is non-negative as long as F ≤ 2
3
(11t− 3R); and
∂2πA
∂γ2A
¯¯¯¯
γA=γB=
1
2
= − 2
81
Ã
2282044
µ
R
t
¶2
− 2277940R
t
− 12033
!
which is negative for 5
2
t < R < 3t. In these circumstances, the firms’ profits
are πA = πB = t − F ≥ 0 as F ≤ t. Since t < 23(11t − 3R) for all R < 3t,
the symmetric equilibrium where pA = pB = 2t and γA = γB =
1
2
exists for
t
2
< F < t under 5
2
t < R < 3t, and it yields γD = 1 > γMC > γ∗.
8.7 Numerical analysis
We have solved the model numerically for R > 6.5t. More specifically, we
have considered values of R/t from 6.5 upwards in steps of 0.05. We report
the results of these numerical simulations only up to R/t = 20, but the same
pattern has been found for higher values. Given R/t, we then examine firm
A’s profits as a function of both F and γA. We consider upward deviations
from the equilibrium candidate, γA =
2t
R+t . Since γA+γB ≤ 1, and γB =
2t
R+t ,
then the relevant range for γA is
£
2t
R+t ,
R−t
R+t
¤
. Note that as γA increases above
2t
R+t , first prices are still equal to R − t, next pB falls below R − t, and
eventually both prices fall below R− t.
The main result is that if R/t ≤ 7 then for all values of F it is never
profitable to deviate from the equilibrium candidate. For values of R/t > 7
then there exist a threshold value of F, F , such that if F ≥ F then there is
no profitable deviation from the equilibrium candidate, but if F < F then
33
a profitable deviation does exist and hence a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies does not exist. Moreover, F = 0 if R/t = 7, F increases with R/t,
and F < (R−t)(R−2t)R+t . See Figure 4.
15
15The program and detailed results are available upon request.
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Figure 1a 
First best and monopolistic competition: 5 2
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Figure 1b 
First best and monopolistic competition: 5 2
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Figure 2 
Duopoly and monopolistic competition. 
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Figure 3 
Duopoly and first best. 
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